The advances in information technology (IT) have changed the way companies conduct business in using electronic commerce strategies, preparing financial reports and having their financial statements audited. Therefore, client firms' IT investments could have effects on audit risk. On one hand, the IT complexity creates challenges for auditors in auditing the effectiveness of internal control and detecting accounting irregularities. On the other hand, IT decreases audit risk by improving operation and internal control effectiveness which may decrease inherent and internal control risk. Yet, the relationship between clients' IT asset portfolios and audit risk remains an empirical question. Using proprietary IT data of US firms from 2000 to 2009, we find that IT investments are positively related to audit fees and abnormal audit fees, and negatively related to the probability of issuance of a going-concern audit opinion.
INTRODUCTION

Business organizations are significantly investing in information technology (IT).
1 IT spending has kept increasing in proportion of firms' budget and already exceeded spending on R&D or advertising (Mithas et al. 2012) . At the same time, IT adopted by firms has become increasingly sophisticated ). The importance of IT investments and their impacts on firm performance, internal controls and risk assessment are being addressed by business entities, auditors and regulators, however, the evidence about the impact of IT investments on audit risk is scarce. The link between IT investments and audit risk is not only critically informative for auditors to make their audit planning but also meaningful for companies' IT investments and implementations. In this paper, we aim to explore the relationship between client firms' IT investments and audit risk by using a unique panel data about IT of U.S. companies.
A growing body of literature provides evidence that IT enhances transparency of operations, decreases intra-and inter-firm transaction costs, improves managerial decision making, increases firms' operating efficiency and also firm value (e.g., Klaus et al. 2000; Hendricks et al. 2007; Kobelsky et al. 2008; Bendoly et al. 2009; Masli et al. 2011; Mithas et al. 2011 Mithas et al. , 2012 Tambe and Hitt 2012) . However, several researchers find that the effect of IT on firm performance may be either mixed or subject to contingencies (Aral and Weill 2007; Xue et al. 2012) . Other studies document that IT investments are risky and not cost effective (e.g., Hitt et al. 2002; Dewan and Ren 2011) . In general, prior studies primarily concentrate on the internal risk effects of IT on companies themselves. In contrast, we focus on the external risk effects of IT on independent auditors.
Regulators realize the key role IT plays in the auditing process. From SAS No. 55 (AICPA 1988 ) to SAS No. 78 (AICPA 1995 We posit that IT investments are associated with audit risk for several reasons. First, while IT possibly creates long-term value for companies, it also increases companies' inherent business risk (such as, earnings volatility, delayed payoff, IT failures, etc., documented in Tsui et al. 2001) . Companies with higher business risk are more likely to misreport their financial statements and lead to audit risk.
Second, the use of IT increases control risk because the control risk is typically associated with inadequate integration of IT systems and lack of data flow transparency as reported in the 2013 TTI survey. 2 For instance, Enterprise Systems may only technically prevent errors and fraud incurred by lower-level managers and employees. Top managers with privileges to the system are still able to conduct misreporting and fraud. Even though most Enterprise
Systems have 'built-in' controls, internal control effectiveness is not realized if companies do not have sufficient information management capability (Mithas et al. 2011 ).
Third, the use of IT increases detection risk. The investments of sophisticated IT systems make it more difficult for auditors with traditional audit methods to detect errors and fraud. Since each company has its own customized IT portfolio, auditing is not a standardized work anymore, and auditors without sufficient IT audit expertise are less likely to detect misstatements. Because it takes time for auditors to become familiar with their clients' IT systems, the detection risk is even worse for new auditors. Auditors are often over-confident about their abilities to assess risk associated with IT (Hunton et al. 2004 ). This over-confidence and insufficient IT capacity will increase detection risk and then increase overall audit risk.
In this paper, we explicitly examine the relationship between client firms' IT investments and audit risk that external auditors bear. We follow the existing literature (Chwelos et al. 2010; Kleis et al. 2012 ) to use three areas of IT infrastructure (namely decentralized computing equipment, centralized computing equipment, and network equipment) to develop a proxy of companies' overall IT investments. Our IT data are obtained from the CI Technology Database.
The biggest advantage of this data is that the number of computers, servers, and network nodes are tightly associated with IT investments in information system rather than automation of business process. We further validate the analysis by using an overall IT intensity measure.
Regarding the measures of audit risk, we follow prior research (e.g., Simunic 1980; Bell et al. 2001; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Cassell et al. 2011 ) to use audit fees as a proxy for audit risk.
We also employ two alternative measures of audit risk: abnormal audit fees and the likelihood of auditor's issuance of a going-concern opinion.
Our sample consists of 8,102 firm-year observations over a period from 2000 to 2009.
Our primary models is the OLS regression of 1) logged audit fees and 2) abnormal audit fees (following Blankley et al. 2012) on IT investments and other fee determinants associated with firm risks, audit effort, and audit-client relations. We also use a probit model to regress on auditor's going-concern opinions against IT investments for financially-distressed companies.
The above tests are based on the stock of IT rather than the flow of IT. We also test the effect of IT variation on the change of audit risk by employing a change model, since client firm's new addition of IT could lead to the complexity of audit tasks.
We find that client firms' IT investments are positively associated with audit fees and abnormal audit fees. The results indicate that client firms' IT investments make audit engagement more challenging and risky. Auditors need to make more efforts to understand client firms' operations and reporting based on the application of IT. Considering the "learning effect"
of auditor tenure (DeAngelo 1981; Knapp 1991), we examine a possibly mitigation effect of audit tenure on the relation between IT investments and audit risk by subsampling with auditor's servicing years. We find that the positive relationship between audit risk and clients' IT investments diminishes with longer tenure, as auditors become more familiar with clients' IT systems and implementations. The results from going-concern opinion model shows that auditors are less likely to issue going-concern opinions to financially distressed firms that have higher levels of IT investments.
Our paper contributes to the literature of auditing and information systems in the following ways. First, the pros and cons of IT have been widely documented in accounting and information system literature, but empirical research on IT in auditing literature is rare even though IT has already been considered as a contributor to audit risk by auditors and becomes more critical in practice. Our research fills this gap by examining IT and audit risk in an integrated research setting. Second, prior accounting literature, such as Hayes et al. (2001) , Ranganathan and Brown (2006) , and Dorantes et al. (2013) , documents the effects of IT by using an indicator variable to represent whether companies implement Enterprise Systems specifically (ERP, SCM, CRM system, etc.) or not. Our research uses unique IT data and aggregate IT measures which can capture the total effect of IT on companies' operating and reporting environment.
Our results generate the following implications: 1) The complicated IT systems implemented by client firms require auditors to have expertise in both auditing and IT; 2) As client firms keep investing more in IT, the impact of IT on audit risk is likely to increase and become more material; 3) In the earlier stage of their tenure, auditors have to input more efforts to study firm-specific IT systems; 4) As traditional internal control processes have changed due to IT implementation, auditors need to adjust their approaches to more appropriately assess internal control quality as required by the SOX.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and presents our hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the data and research design. Section 4 presents the main empirical tests. In Section 5, we present additional tests. Section 6 concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Information technology (IT) has changed the ways of business operation, managerial decision making, and information processing. IT also changes the way companies initiate, authorize, record, process, and report transactions and other financial data that auditors primarily care about. It is necessary that auditors consider both benefits and risk coming along with clients'
IT systems during their audit engagements.
The Benefits of IT
There is a large body of literature documenting the benefits of IT from different perspectives of firm performance (e.g., Dedrick et al. 2003; Melville et al. 2004; Kohli and Grover 2008) . Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1996) find that IT reduces production costs and increases customer satisfaction. Other studies find that investments in IT increase financial and market performance (e.g., Bharadwaj 2000; Zhu and Kraemer 2002) and improves organizational innovativeness (Kleis et al. 2012; Xue et al. 2012 ) across different contexts. Dorantes et al. (2013) report that Enterprise Systems improve companies' internal information environment and increases both quantity and quality of management forecasts. Kobelsky et al. (2008) suggest that investing IT is essentially a way for companies to realize their strategic goals of improving future performance.
Some other studies document that IT fosters information communication. The use of IT provides complete, transparent, and timely information for managerial decision making (Klaus et al. 2000; Hendricks et al. 2007; Bendoly et al. 2009 ). For example, an empirical study by Hodge et al. (2004) shows that companies that implement search-facilitating technologies (e.g., XBRL)
improve the transparency of their financial statements. Another study by Choi et al. (2010b) finds that IT investments can improve information sharing among employees. They conduct a field study in South Korea using 139 on-going teams and 743 individuals and find that IT has a positive impact on team performance, knowledge sharing, and knowledge application.
The Risk of IT
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The existing literature has also recognized the potential adverse effects of IT investments.
IT assets are inherently risky due to the uncertainty of their economic impact, technological complexity, rapid obsolescence, and investment challenges. 3 Aral and Weill (2007) find that the impact of IT investments on performance and risk varies across companies and measures of performance. Based on data from 147 U.S. firms from 1999 to 2002, they find that companies' total IT investments are not associated with performance. In addition, an event study conducted by Dewan and Ren (2007) provides evidence that wealth effects are not significant after controlling for contemporaneous risk changes. Furthermore, Inefficient budgeting in IT also discounts the benefit of IT investments. Kobelsky et al. (2008) find that departure from the optimal IT budget level will lead to a lower level of firm performance.
IT investments involve a wider range of risks than investments in other assets. The magnitude of IT investments is often large and many IT investments projects (e.g., ERP, SCM, CRM system) are time-consuming. The payoffs from these projects are often unpredictable and take time to realize. Poston and Grabski (2001) find that it takes three years to realize improvement on firm performance from the investments of ERP systems. Besides, IT only provides comparative and temporary advantage which will diminish when peer firms also implement IT. Earlier research by Weill (1992) argues that, even though IT can improve firm performance through cost reduction and revenue expansion, the competitive advantage may disappear once IT becomes common. show that IT investments make a greater contribution to overall firm risk than do non-IT investments. The main reason is that the development of IT is so rapidly that some employees, even top managers and IT specialists, do 3 IT risks are broadly considered as the failure of IT investments to achieve its objectives as IT risk can effect risk in other areas such as financial, regulatory and legal, customer, reputation and competition. We adopt a definition of IT In addition, IT security risk is always a concern as the application of IT is also related to other nonconventional threats. Internet plays a pervasive and fundamental role in business IT investments, thus business will face the exposure of IT systems to external threats and breaches of information security will become more likely. Further, companies investing more in IT are more likely to be influenced by the unstable IT environment, e.g., cloud computing, virtualization, and mobile computing, etc., (Debreceny 2013). Finally, the investments of IT also introduce inherently unique risks due to tightly linked interdependencies of business processes, relational databases, and process reengineering. These risks incurred by implementing IT have not been fully considered in audit planning and process.
IT Investments and Audit Risks
Audit risk is composed of inherent risk, control risk and detection risk, and is influenced by client firms' business environments and reporting behaviors (Cushing and Loebbecke 1983).
IT investments change companies' operating environment. For example, companies can make transactions and real-time financial statements through their Enterprise Systems. As described in the previous section, IT is likely to influence the inherent risk.
The investments of IT systems are also likely to increase control and detection risk for external auditors. IT automates transactions and the processing of financial information. For example, ERP systems have 'built-in' controls as a key feature. However, IT business process risks may be caused by a lack of security of information processing which affects control risk. IT control risks are often associated with inadequate integration of systems and lack of data flow transparency. Therefore, internal control could be more effective in a fully automated and integrated IT systems. Morris (2011) finds that ERP-implementing companies are less likely to be issued internal control weakness opinions than other companies. However, auditors need to augment their knowledge and professional judgments when evaluating IT-based internal control
systems.
Behavioral research also shows that IT has an impact on detection risk. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
From the perspective of accounting and financial reporting, managers need to consider these potential risks and disclose information to investors in order to allow the firm values to be fairly evaluated. However, managers have incentives to overstate the benefits and understate the risks of IT. Company insiders (e.g., managers, employees, etc.) and major stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, lenders, etc.) can both share the benefits and bear risks of IT. For corporate insiders and major investors, increased benefits of IT may offset the increased risk. However, external auditors, as corporate outsiders and independent third parties, may have to bear the increased audit risk without benefiting from their clients' IT investments. Therefore, we propose our first hypothesis:
H1: Client firms' IT investments are positively associated with audit risk.
Accounting professionals realize the higher uncertainty and potential audit failures when they start new engagements (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2010). From the perspective of auditor experience, audit quality increases with auditor tenure over time as the auditor gains a better understanding of the client's system, business and industry environment, and internal controls (AICPA 1978) . Audit risk is likely to be higher in the early stage of audit tenure, because new auditors lack the specific knowledge of their clients and their business.
DeAngelo (1981) propose a "learning curve" of incumbent auditors. Audit risk can be reduced when auditors become familiar with their clients' operating system, business environment and associated risk with a sufficient tenure. Knapp (1991) proposes that the positive relation between auditor tenure and audit quality reverses in the late stage of audit engagement.
Johnson et al. (2002) stress the negative impact of short tenure on audit quality in initial years of the auditor-client relationship. Myers et al. (2003) document that audit quality is positively related to auditor tenure. Stanley and DeZoort (2007) find that auditor tenure is negatively associated with the likelihood of financial restatements. Brooks (2012) explains that the "learning effect" attenuates following the turning point and proves that the "learning effect"
dominates "bonding effect" in an appropriate term limit. Other evidences also show that auditors with short tenure face higher litigation risk and higher likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting, and fail to issue going-concern opinions to financially distressed companies (Palmrose 1987 (Palmrose , 1991 Stice 1991; Carcello and Nagy 2004) .
Each company has its firm-specific IT investment and infrastructure. Client firms' IT investments increases the complexity of audit and particularly challenges auditors in the earlier stage of audit tenure, especially for firms whose managements and employees do not have sufficient IT capacity. To decrease audit risk, auditors would either hire IT audit specialists or seek IT consultation service. The effect of audit tenure should be stronger for firms with more sophisticated IT capabilities. After years, auditors become familiar with their clients' IT environment and have better knowledge about the clients' IT systems. Thus, we include auditor tenure as a mediating factor and we posit that audit risk associated with client firms' IT systems will decrease in the later years of audit tenure. Based on these arguments, we generate our second hypothesis:
H2:
The observed positive association between IT investments and audit risk is stronger (weaker) in the earlier (later) stage of audit tenure.
DATA & RESEARCH MODELS
Sample and Variables
The data used to measure IT investments is from the Harte-Hanks CI Technology
Database. This database covers over 500,000 sites in the United States and Canada on IT infrastructure and 10 key IT areas. We collect client firm fundamentals from Compustat and audit data from AuditAnalytics over the period from 2000 to 2009 to measure audit risk, since audit fee disclosure is available from 2000 in AuditAnalytics. All our sample firms are USdomiciled companies.
IT Investments
We develop two types of measures for IT investments: one type is based on IT component counts and the other is based on overall IT intensity which is defined as the ratio of IT assets to total assets or to the number of employees.
First, we obtain count measures of three key IT infrastructure components, i.e., PC, server, and network node, and we use these count measures to capture the overall IT investments.
As suggested by the existing literature (e.g., Chwelos et al. 2010; Kleis et al. 2012) , PC count reflects the investments of decentralized computing equipment, server count reflects the investments of centralized computing equipment, and network nodes reflects the investments of electronic communication equipment. In addition to using these three measures separately, we also use factor analysis to generate a composite measure (ITFactor) of these IT components to capture IT investments.
Second, we use two measures of IT intensity for robustness analysis. The IT infrastructure count measures may not sufficiently capture other IT spending on software, staff and maintenance (although it is highly correlated with infrastructure spending). Therefore, we follow the existing literature (e.g., Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996; Xue et al. 2012 ) to estimate total IT hardware capital value by calculating the total nominal market value of PCs and servers, deflated using the PC price index and price index for computers and peripheral equipment from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Then we estimate IT stock on software, staff and maintenance expense as three times the IT labor expense. The sum of IT hardware capital and IT stock on software, staff and maintenance is the total IT capital of the firm. We then develop two normalized measures of IT intensity. The first measure is the total IT capital divided by total assets. The second measure is the total IT capital divided by the number of employees.
Audit Risk
Auditors are sensitive to both the control risk and inherent risk of client firms and will respond to those risks by increasing audit service fees. Following prior research (e.g., Simunic A going-concern opinion issued by auditor reflects the liquidity risk of the company, the auditor's detection risk, and the audit independence. Auditors could reduce the exposure to litigation risk when engaging in a financially stressed client by issuing a going-concern report (Carcello and Palmrose 1994). Prior research documents that audit fees and litigation concerns are associated with the going-concern audit opinion (see, e.g., Blay and Geiger 2013; Chen et al. 2013 ). Therefore, the relationship between IT and audit risk can be tested by the likelihood that an auditor may issue a going-concern opinion to the financially distressed company.
Empirical Models
We test the association between IT investments and audit risk using three different models on audit fees, abnormal audit fees, and going-concern opinions, respectively. To estimate abnormal audit fees, 5 we use the model as in Blankley et al. (2012) . The calculation of abnormal audit fees is detailed in Appendix A.
To test the relationship between audit fees and IT investments (H1), we construct our first OLS regression model as follows:
where; AuditFee = the natural log of audit fees; PC = the natural log of the number of personal computers that a client firm uses during the fiscal year; Server = the natural log of the number of servers that a client firm uses during the fiscal year; Network = the natural log of the number of network nodes that a client firm uses during the fiscal year; ITFactor = a component from factor analysis of the PC count, server count, and network node count that a client firm uses during the fiscal year; ITIntensity 1 = total IT capital divided by total assets; ITIntensity 2 = total IT capital divided by the number of employees; ITFee = the ratio of IT fees to audit fees; DumITFee = a dummy variable, 1if auditor receives IT fees, and 0 otherwise; CSize = the natural log of market value of common equity at fiscal year-end; RecInv = sum of total account receivable and total inventory, scaled by total assets; ROA = earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets at year end; Loss = a dummy variable, 1 if net income is negative, and 0 otherwise; Leverage = financial leverage, calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets at year end; BigN = an indicator variable equals to 1 if the auditor is a Big-5 auditor before 2002 or a Big-4 after 2002, and 0 otherwise; GCAO = a dummy variable, 1 if auditor issues a going-concern audit opinion, and 0 otherwise; Segment = the natural log of 1 plus the number of business and geographic segments; Export = the ratio of foreign sales to total sales; Litigation = an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a high-litigation industry and 0 otherwise; Third, we use auditor's issuance of a going-concern opinion as a proxy for audit risk.
Following DeFond et al. (2002), we use a probit regression to estimate the auditor opinion model specified as follows:
where: Altman = Altman (1968) Z-score, measure of the probability of bankruptcy, with a lower value indicating greater financial distress; FirmAge = the natural log of the number of years of data for the client firm since the coverage in Compustat; Return = the firm's cumulative stock returns over the current year; RetVolatility = the standard deviation of monthly returns over the current year; ChgLeverage = change in Leverage from the previous year to the current year; OCF = operating cash flow (Compustat item: OANCF) divided by total assets for the current year; Investments = short-and long-term investment securities (including cash and cash equivalents) (Compustat items: CHE and IVPT), scaled by total assets; and NewFinance = an indicator variable equal to 1 if a client has a new issuance of equity or debt in the subsequent fiscal year (i.e., nonzero Compustat item: DLTIS or the amount of Compustat item: SSTK exceeding 5 percent of the firm's market value of equity) and 0 otherwise.
All the other variables are defined previously. We expect in model (3) is negative.
More IT investments decrease the possibility for auditors to issue going-concern opinions to financial distressed clients when the audit risk is high. Equation (3) is estimated using a pooled logistic regression, and the significance level of the coefficients is derived based on robust standard errors clustered by the client firm and the auditor. As in DeFond et al. (2002), we classify a firm as financially distressed when it reports either negative earnings or negative operating cash flow during the current fiscal year. Firm-years following first time going-concern opinions are excluded because our focus is on auditors' decisions to issue first time goingconcern opinions. Appendix B provides further details to motivate these explanatory variables.
Our panel dataset in equation (1) Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest and control variables that we use in our main empirical analyses and additional tests. We winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99% level. AuditFee is the natural log format of total audit fees for each fiscal year. The mean (median) audit fees charged to client firms is $13.698 logged dollars ($13.708 logged dollars). We follow the work of Blankley et al. (2012) Furthermore, 1.2% of clients receive going-concern audit opinions and 17.4% of companies restate their financial statements. 21% of clients are classified by technology firms and about 30% of clients are of the litigation type simply based on their industry classification. Overall, our sample firms are just slightly larger in term of client market value and pay higher audit fees and IT fees, compared to the whole Compustat US sample pool. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the counts of PCs, servers, network nodes, and the aggregate measure of IT factor (PC or Server or Network or ITFactor) have positive correlations with audit fees at the p-value < 0.001 level, respectively. Meanwhile, IT investments (PC or Server or Network or ITFactor) are negatively correlated with the probability of receiving a going-concern audit opinion and the absolute value of abnormal accruals. IT investments are positively associated with Big-N auditor, financial statement restatements, and client firms' market value.
MAIN RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Panel B shows that the correlation between IT intensity and abnormal audit fees is positive at the p-value less than the 5% level. We also find that both measures of IT intensity are negatively correlated with the probability of receiving a going-concern audit opinion. Internal control weakness (ICW) is positively related to abnormal audit fees, and negatively related to the two measures of IT intensity. Table 3 presents the regression results of our first test. Regressions of PC, Server and Network on audit fees are shown in the first three columns. We notice that the coefficients of all IT variables are positive and highly significant (PC coefficient = 0.099, p-value < 0.001; Server coefficient = 0.144, p-value < 0.001; Network coefficient = 0.083, p-value < 0.001), after controlling for other factors (e.g., client firms characteristics, client-auditor economic bonding, auditor metrics) that may influence audit fees. The adjusted R 2 s are around 75%, which is not uncommon with many previously documented audit fee model results. The results are consistent with our predictions that IT investments increases audit fees. To test the effect of overall IT investments on audit fees, we use factor analysis to derive a single latent factor -ITFactor to represent all three types of IT assets. The coefficient of ITFactor is positive and highly significant (ITFactor coefficient = 0.295, p-value < 0.001).
[Insert Table 2 about here] Multivariate Tests
Consistent with theories and prior research, most coefficients for control variables in our models have expected signs. Specifically, firms have larger size, are audited by Big-N, with higher leverage, financial restatements, and earnings losses pay higher audit fees. Firms that operate in high litigation industries and high technology industries pay higher audit fees than other firms. In contrast, firms with higher rates of return on assets and pay higher IT fees tend to pay less audit fees.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
To examine our H2, we partition the sample into two groups based on different term limits of auditor tenure (3-year as a cutoff). Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) IT investments and/or implementation. They need to put more efforts and bear higher risk so they charge higher audit fees. In our sensitivity tests, we use five-year or longer tenure as a cutoff. The un-tabulated results show that the significant difference diminishes if we select five years or longer as our cutoff point. Overall, the results are consistent with our expectation that the positive relationship between audit risk and clients' IT investments is stronger at the early stage of audit tenure, supporting our H2.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
We further use abnormal audit fees to test the relation between audit risk and IT. Table 5 reports the results of regression on abnormal audit fees. The abnormal audit fees are part of the total audit fees and engagement profit which cannot be explained by expected audit risk and [Insert Table 5 about here]
ADDITIONAL TESTS
To test the validity and robustness of our analysis, we introduce alternative measures of IT investments and audit risks. First, we use different IT measures to test whether the previous results are robust. Second, we use the likelihood of an auditor's issuance of a going-concern audit opinion to capture audit risk. We then test how IT affects the probability of the client receiving a going-concern opinion.
The above-mentioned results in Table 3 We follow the existing literature (Chwelos et al. 2010; Xue et al. 2012 ) to calculate IT capital. Table 6 1 st Column shows that the coefficients of both ITIntensity1 and ITIntensity2 are positive and significant at the 5% level. Therefore, our hypothesis is still supported by using IT intensity measures. The results on control variables are qualitatively consistent with those in Table 3 .
Next, we regress abnormal audit fees against IT intensity measures. In Table 6 2 nd Column, the coefficients of IT intensity measures are both positive and significant (evidenced by the p-value at the 3.4% level for ITIntensity1 and 4.9% for ITIntensity2, respectively). Internal control weakness (ICW) is again positively and significantly associated with abnormal fees. In conclusion, all of the results using different IT measures and different proxies for audit risk consistently support our H1. Table 7 reports the results of the going-concern audit opinion (GCAO) probit model. ITIntensity2: coefficient = -0.008, p-value = 0.044). These results support our argument that IT affects auditors' judgments of clients' going-concern issues and increases auditors' detection risk.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Analysis above reports the positive relation between IT investments and audit risk. The results imply that, ceteris paribus, firms with more IT investments have higher audit risk.
Therefore, auditors take IT investments into account in their audit planning as a factor for the audit risk. Now that auditors are sensitive to clients' IT investments, they should also sensitive to the change of IT investments. If client firms purchase, upgrade or reconstruct their IT (purchase new computer, servers, new version of software), the risk associated with IT investments will accordingly increase. Hence, auditors need to accommodate their audit planning and exert more efforts to understand the IT systems of their clients, then they will charge higher audit fees accordingly. Conversely, if client firms decrease their IT investments, the relation will reverse.
We employ a "change" model of audit fees. Audit work varies with changes in the inherent risk of client firms. O' Keefe et al. (1994) suggest that both audit hours and labor are sensitive to client size, complexity, leverage, and inherent risk. We implement change analysis, using change in IT as the inherent risk factor, for a possible root cause analysis of audit risk. Thus, we predict that change of IT investments positively associated with change in audit fees. We follow the model by Cassell et al. (2011) and test the association between IT investment change and audit fee change. The audit fee change model is specified as follows:
All variables are defined previously. The sample decreases to 6,104 observations because some firms only have one year data and others miss one or several years during the sample period.
The estimations results are reported in Table 8 . We find that the coefficient of is positive (β 1 = 0.224) and highly significant (p-value < 0.001). This result is consistent with our prediction. Therefore, when client companies increase their IT investments, their audit risk will increase and auditor will increase audit fees charge accordingly. This result also confirms our previous analysis and further proves that auditor concerns client firms' IT investments and will make extra audit work as new risk from IT is being plugged in.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Other Additional Tests
In this subsection we discuss several additional tests. The results of these tests remain qualitatively consistent with the results in the abovementioned main analyses. Our supplemental tests include:
i. We adopt a more comprehensive IT intensity measure by using the sum of abovementioned IT capital value and three times of the IT labor expense (to capture IT spending on software, staff and training). 7 Further robustness checks using alternative measures with two or four times the labor cost produce qualitatively similar results;
ii. We rerun the model equation (2) without the sample observations with negative abnormal fees (i.e., keeping the sample firms that pay abnormally high audit fees and are presumably associated with higher audit risk);
iii. We use decile ranks for all of the control variables except for dummy variables in the audit fee model equations;
iv.
We employ the robust cluster technique proposed by Petersen (2009) in the audit fee models. In our main analysis, we do not add the industry fixed effect because the two control variables, Litigation and Technology, are indeed used to control for industry difference.
v. We also rerun the analysis without firm-year observations when firms switch their auditors.
CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the relationship between client firms' IT investments and external auditors' audit risk. Advances in information technology have dramatically changed firms' business processes and the ways financial reports are prepared and communicated. As a result, the use of IT also has an important impact on how firms' financial reports should be audited. As firms' internal business operations and external interactions with suppliers, partners, and consumers have become more digitized and IT-based, auditors are required to possess both financial and IT knowledge in conducting auditing services. Prior literature has mainly focused on whether IT improves focal firms' productivity, operation efficiency and transparency, or increases business risk. This study does not repudiate IT as a promising opportunity for business but does provide a new insight on the potentially negative impact of IT from a different perspective -the audit risk for external auditors.
We use different measures of IT and audit risk in the empirical analysis and provide evidence that firms with higher levels of IT investments generate higher audit risks for external auditors. This finding suggests that implementing IT as discretionary assets has far-reaching impacts in addition to improving focal firms' performance and increasing their business risks. In addition, we also test whether auditor tenure has mitigation effect on the relation between audit risk and IT investments. We find audit risk is higher in the early stage of engagement since auditor need time to accommodate the new clients. The key implication of our findings is that independent auditors need to advance their capabilities to audit sophisticated information systems and IT-based internal control, and improve their professional skills to decrease detection risk in auditing IT-intensive business organizations. 
Appendix A: Calculation of Abnormal Audit Fees
Based on the recent work of Blankley et al. (2012), we calculate the abnormal (or unexplained) audit fees from the model as specified below:
where:
AuditFee
= the natural log of audit fees; logAT = the natural log of total assets at year end; CurrRatio = current ratio, current assets divided by current liabilities; CurrAT = current assets divided by total assets at year end; RecInv = sum of total account receivable and total inventory, scaled by total assets; ROA = earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets at year end; Loss = a dummy variable, 1 if net income is negative, and 0 otherwise; et al. (2003) and is determined by SIC code as follows: agriculture (0100-0999), mining and construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399), food (2000-2111) , textiles and printing/publishing (2200-2799), chemicals (2800-2824; 2840-2899), pharmaceuticals (2830-2836), extractive (1300-1399; 2900-2999), durable manufactures (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579 and 3670-3679) , transportation (4000-4899), retail (5000-5999), services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379), computers (3570-3579; 3670-3679; 7370-7379) , and utilities (4900-4999). There is the total of 13 industry groups, so 12 dummy variables are used in regression.
Following the model by Blankley et al. (2012) , we control several groups of variables influencing audit fees. To control for audit effort, we include client firms' size (logAT), the presence of merger and acquisition (Merger) and foreign operations (Foreign), the total number of business segments and geographic segments (Segment), the going-concern opinion issued by auditors (GCAO). To control for audit risk, we include current ratio (CurrRatio), current assets scaled by total assets, sum of account receivable and inventory scaled by total assets (RecInv), return on assets (ROA), dummy variable of loss (Loss), and the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (Intang). Financial leverage (Leverage) is to control for the clients' capital structure.
December is the busiest month for auditors, so firms whose fiscal yearend is the December 31 st probably pay higher audit fees. We use a dummy (Busy) to control for this factor.
Under the SOX Act Section 404, auditors are required to assess and report the adequacy of the company's internal control on financial reporting. The SOX Act is costly to implement and likely increases audit fees. Therefore, there should be a difference in audit fee charged between firms that receive material weakness opinions and firms that do not. Actually, the effect of the material weakness opinion is "sticky". We define dummy variable (ICW) to distinguish between firms that receive a material weakness opinion in the current or next year and firms that do not. Audit fees may be different across different industries, so we follow Ashbaugh et al. This table reports the regression results of OLS estimation for two different types of IT intensity on audit fees or abnormal audit fees. ITIntensity1 represents the ratio of the value of IT assets to total assets, and ITIntensity2 represents the value of IT assets per employee for each firm-year. We calculate IT assets intensity by referring to Xue et al. (2012) . Controls, intercepts and year-dummy effects are omitted for brevity. Refer to the Appendix for variable descriptions. 
